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Case No. 20150565-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff! Appellee, 
v. 
TIIvIOTHY JOSEPH ADAivIS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for production of a controlled 
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 
Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant is a 65-year-old man in poor health, who lives alone in 
rural Big Water, Utah, and calls his mother almost daily. When Defendant's 
mother had not heard from Defendant in several days and could not reach 
him, she became worried and called police to do a welfare check. 
Defendant's mother explained to the police that her son may need medical 
assistance. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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At Defendant's house, the responding officer saw a light on, 
suggesting that someone was home, but no one answered the officer's 
knocks, and neighbors reported not seeing Defendant for several days. The 
officer believed that Defendant was inside the home and needed help. 
The officer entered Defendant's home under the emergency aid 
doctrine-an exception to the Fourth Amend1nent-that allows warrantless 
entry if an officer has an objectively reasonable basis to believe that a person 
within the home is in need of medical aid. The officer walked through the 
home looking for Defendant but instead of finding Defendant, found his 
marijuana plants. Police subsequently obtained a search warrant for 
Defendant's property and seized the drugs and other drug-related evidence. 
Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the 
officer's warrantless entry into his home violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights. When the trial court denied his motion, Defendant entered a 
conditional plea, preserving his right to appeal the h·ial court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the h·ial court correctly rule that the warrantless search of 
Defendant's house was lawful under the emergency aid doch·ine? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a 
mixed question of fact and law. The factual findings underlying a h·ial 
-2-
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court's ruling are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, 
,Ill, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions, including its 
application of the legal standard to the facts, are reviewed non-deferentially 
for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 115, 103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affinnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
A. Summary of facts. 
Defendant's mother was worried. R356:34, 36. Defendant, a 65-year-
old-man in poor health living alone in rural Big Water, Utah, called her" on 
an almost daily basis." R356:34-35. But she had not heard frmn him in four 
days and could not reach hin1. R357:15-17. So, she called police to do a 
welfare check. R357:15-17; R356:24-25. 
1 The pleadings section of the record is in reverse order. However, 
citations are given in linear order, for ease of reading. The facts are 
prin1arily taken fron1 the trial court's n1emorandu1n decision, R313-318, the 
testimony from the suppression hearing, R357, and evidence presented at 
the preliminary hearing, R356. 
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Big Water's marshal assigned Deputy Robert M. Johnson, who had 
experience responding to similar welfare check calls, to respond. R356:25, 
34-35. Deputy Jolmson learned from dispatch that Defendant's mother 
requested the welfare check because Defendant was in poor health and she 
had not heard from him in several days. R356:34-35. In the past when 
Deputy Johnson responded to similar calls, he found individuals in their 
home either incapacitated or dead. R356:47. Given the information provided 
by Defendant's mother and his experience with welfare checks, Deputy 
Johnson's only concern was that Defendant may be inside his home 
unconscious or dead. R356:47; R357:16, 20-21. 
It was already dark outside when Deputy Jolmson arrived at 
Defendant's home- a single wide trailer without a driveway or garage 
surrounded by a chain link fence. R356:35; R64. Deputy Jolmson had only 
"vague" information about what type of car Defendant drove. R356:42-43. 
The marshal had told Deputy Johnson that he thought Defendant drove a 
pick-up truck and a motorcycle, but "he wasn't real sure." R356:42-43. 
Regardless, Deputy Johnson did not remember any vehicles at Defendant's 
house that night. R356:39, 42-43; R357:13-14. 
Deputy Johnson noticed a light on in the living room. R357:12. He 
also noticed a window in the living room slightly open with an electrical 
-4-
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cord coming out of it. R356:36-37. And he noticed a light on in the crawl 
space under the trailer. R357:12-13. 
Deputy Jolu1son "knocked on the door" and "hollered for" 
Defendant. R356:35. When Defendant did not answer, Deputy Johnson 
yelled for Defendant through the open window and "ma[de] a racket on the 
side of the trailer." R.356:36-37. Deputy Johnson also tried to look into the 
house, but he could not see much. R356:36; R357:12. From the little he could 
see, he did not see any problems-no sign of forced entry into the home, no 
sign of a struggle- but given the medical nature of Defendant's mother's 
concern, Deputy Jolmson did not expect to see those things either. R356:42, 
47; R357:12-13. 
Deputy Johnson continued his search for Defendant around the 
property. R356:35. Deputy Johnson found a ladder leaning against the 
house and used it to look on the roof, but he only found some rusty tools 
next to the air conditioner. R356:36; R357:13. He also looked in the crawl 
space, where a light was on, and found tools and evidence of repair work, 
but did not find Defendant. R356:35, 38, 45. Deputy Johnson spoke to the 
neighbors, who reported that they had not seen Defendant for "two to three 
days." R356:36. 
-5-
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Deputy Johnson then called Defendant's mother to let her know that 
he had not found Defendant. R356:36. Deputy Johnson asked Defendant's 
mother if she wanted him to look inside the house. R356:36. Defendant's 
mother said, "yes, please, whatever means possible. I just need to know he's 
okay." R356:36; R357:20. 
Deputy Johnson entered Defendant's home through the open 
window, which led him into the living room-the one room in the house 
with a light on. R356:36, R147. Almost immediately, in plain view, Deputy 
Johnson saw a grow light and several marijuana plants in different stages of 
cultivation. R356:46, Exhibits 3-5, R64, 128, 147. Deputy Johnson took photos 
of the marijuana plants, and then searched the rest of the house in places 
where Defendant might be. R356:46-47, R317, Exhibits 3-5. When Deputy 
Johnson did not find Defendant, he left. R317, R147. 
Both Deputy Johnson and the marshal were then out of town for a 
few days for training. R357:26. When the marshal returned, he went to 
Defendant's house "as soon as [he] could" to check on Defendant. R357:26. 
The marshal saw Defendant in his yard and "could tell that he was okay." 
R357:26. 
The marshal then shifted his priorities from Defendant's welfare to 
Defendant's crimes. R357:26. Later that day, the marshal obtained a search 
-6-
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warrant for the marijuana plants inside of Defendant's house. R357:26-27, 
R64. 
When Deputy Johnson and the marshal arrived to execute the 
warrant, they found Defendant loading marijuana plants in his pickup truck 
and texting on his cellphone. R357:8; R316. The officers asked Defendant if 
he still had plants inside his house, and Defendant replied "[t]here might be 
one. I've got rid of most of them." R356:48. 
Officers found six marijuana plants inside of Defendant's trailer. 
R356:14-16. They also found industrial grow lights, potting soil, planting 
implements, two baggies of marijuana, a plastic baggie with buds, a platter 
of chopped marijuana, a joint, rolling papers, a grinder with marijuana 
residue, a rifle, and a bong. R356:14. Based on the evidence, the officers 
obtained a second search warrant for Defendant's rifle and cellphone. R61-
62. 
When asked why he was growing marijuana, Defendant responded "I 
just wan[t] to retire and smoke dope." R356:18. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with two second degree felonies, production 
of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute; two third degree felonies, obstruction of justice, and 
-7-
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possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person; and one class A 
misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone. R4-6. 
After a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over as charged. R53-56. 
Motion to Suppress. Defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the 
officers' search of his trailer and to quash the search warrants, arguing that 
no exigent circumstances allowed Deputy Johnson to make his initial 
warrantless entry into Defendant's home. R70-77, 96-132. 
Trial Court's Ruling. After extensive briefing, and both a preliminary 
hearing and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's 
motion and entered its findings of facts and conclusions of law in a 
Memorandum Decision. R70-77, 96-132, 137-149, 159-268, 313-318, 356, 357. 
The court ruled that Deputy Johnson's initial warrantless entry into 
Defendant's home was reasonable under the emergency aid exception to the 
Fourth Amendment. R313-314. In support, the court found that Defendant's 
mother had informed Deputy Johnson that Defendant suffered "from health 
issues," and that she normally has "regular, even daily contact with 
Defendant," but that she "had not been able to reach Defendant for days." 
R314. The court found that "Defendant's neighbors [had] informed Deputy 
Johnson they had not see[n] [D]efendant for a few days." R314. 
-8-
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The court also found that Deputy Johnson had conducted welfare 
checks previously "under the same types of circumstances," and " [ o ]n those 
occasions he had discovered people in their homes that were deceased or 
incapacitated." R314. And, the court found that here, Deputy Johnson 
"observed signs suggesting that someone was home; but no one responded 
to his knock or caiis into the home." R314. Finaiiy, the court found that 
Deputy Johnson "relayed this information to Defendant's mother who was 
adamant that her son may be in need of medical help." R314. 
The court concluded that "[v]iewing these circumstances objectively, 
and as a whole, it was reasonable for Deputy Johnson to conclude there was 
an emergency and that [D]efendant was in immediate need of life-saving 
assistance." R314. Finally, the court found that once Deputy Johnson 
entered the home, he looked only "in places where an incapacitated person 
could be found." R314. Thus, both "the search entry" -through the open 
window - and the "search were reasonable and lawful under the 
circumstances." R314. Consequently, "Deputy Johnson's observations of 
[the 1narijuana plants] was lawful," and there was a valid basis "to conclude 
that probable cause existed for authorization of a search warrant."R314. 
Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal. Defendant entered conditional 
guilty pleas to production of a conh·olled substance and possession of a 
-9-
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controlled substance with intent to distribute, both second degree felonies, 
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's suppression ruling. R335-340. 
As part of a plea agreement, the State dismissed the remaining three 
charges. R336. The trial court then sentenced Defendant to two suspended 
prison terms of 1-15 years and placed Defendant on Intense Bench 
Probation for 36 months. R350. 
Defendant timely appealed. R352-353. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that Deputy Johnson's warrantless entry into his 
home violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and that the trial court thus 
erred when it denied his motion to suppress the fruit of that entry. 
Specifically, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the 
emergency aid doctrine applied, asserting that Deputy Johnson did not 
have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's right to be secure in 
his home against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the Fourth 
A1nendment, warrantless entries into private homes are presumed 
unreasonable. But that presumption is rebutted if exigent circumstances 
reasonably support the entry. 
-10-
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One such exigent circumstance is defined by the emergency aid 
doctrine. In Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 994 P.2d 1283, this 
Court articulated a three-part test which conditioned e1nergency aid entries 
on the presence of life-threatening injuries and the absence of improper 
police motive. But in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), the United 
States Supreme Court rejected that test, holding that an officer can make a 
warrantless entry into a person's home so long as he has an objectively 
reasonable basis to believe that a person within the house is in need of 
immediate aid. 
Here, the record supports the trial court's ruling that Deputy 
Johnson's entry into Defendant's home was justified under the emergency 
aid doctrine. Defendant's mother requested a welfare check on her 65-year-
old son because she had not heard from him in several days and he was in 
poor health. When Deputy Johnson arrived at Defendant's home to conduct 
the check, he saw signs that someone was home, but no one answered the 
door. And the neighbors had not seen Defendant for days. These 
circumstances provided Deputy Johnson with an objectively reasonable 
basis to believe that Defendant was in need of aid. Thus, the trial court 
correctly ruled that Deputy Johnson's warrantless entry was lawful under 
the emergency aid doctrine. 
-11-
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEPUTY JOHNSON'S WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO DEFENDANT'S 
HOME WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINE 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it relied on the 
emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to 
uphold Deputy Johnson's warrantless entry into his house. Br. Aplt. 15. 
Defendant argues that the emergency aid exception does not apply because 
Deputy Johnson did not have an "objectively reasonable basis to believe 
that an emergency existed or that there was an immediate need for 
assistance for the protection of life." Br. Aplt. 13. Thus, Defendant argues, 
Deputy Johnson's enh-y violated the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of that entry. Br. Aplt. 19. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. Emergency aid entries are governed by the test articulated in 
Brigham City v. Stuart, which abrogated the test adopted in 
Salt Lake City v. Davidson. 
The "touchstone of ... the Fourth Amendment" is reasonableness. 
Pennsylvania v. Mirnms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977). Under the Fourth 
Amendment, a warrantless search inside a home is presumptively 
um1 easonable. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). But that presumption is not absolute. In 
some cases, "the exigencies of the situations [may] make the needs of law 
-12-
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enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively 
reasonable." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978)(quotations 
omitted). The United States Supreme Court has identified several 
circumstances that justify warrantless searches or entries under the "exigent 
circumstances" exception. Such circumstances include when police enter a 
home while in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 
427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); when police enter a home to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39-40 (1963); or when 
police search the home of an arrestee for persons "posing a danger to those 
on the arrest scene." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (protective 
sweep). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the need to render 
emergency aid as another exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless 
entry or search. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2009). The 
emergency aid doctrine allows police officers warrantless entry into a home 
to render "emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an 
occupant from imminent injury." Id. This exception recognizes that an 
officer's role extends beyond that of a crime fighter into one of a community 
caretaker-conducting "preventative patrols," aiding "individuals who are 
in danger of physical harm," "creat[ing] and 1naintain[ing] a feeling of 
-13-
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security in the community," and "provid[ing] other services on an 
emergency basis." 3 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment §6.6 (5th ed.) (citation omitted); see also United States v. 
Coccia, 446 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing officers "are expected to aid 
those in dish·ess, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from 
materializing and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and 
protect public safety" (quotation and citation omitted)); United States v. 
King, 990 F.2d 1552 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing officers may legitimately 
seize an individual "to ensure the safety of the public and/ or the 
individual, regardless of any suspected criminal activity"). The exception 
recognizes that when responding as a community caretaker, "the business 
of policemen ... is to act" quickly and "not to speculate" because "[p]eople 
could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm 
deliberation associated with the judicial process." Wayne v. United States, 318 
F.2d 205,212 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
In asserting that the trial court erred in applying the emergency aid 
doctrine here, Defendant cites Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 
994 P.2d 1283, for the applicable test. Br. Aplt. 10-11. In Davidson, this Court 
held that a warrantless search is "lawful under the emergency aid doctrine" 
if the following three-part test is met: "(1) police have an objectively 
-14-
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reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists and believe there is an 
immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life"; 11 (2) [t]he 
search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence"; 
and 11 (3) [t]here is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the 
area or place to be searched." 2000 UT App 12, ,Iif12-13. Defendant's 
reliance on Davidson is misplaced. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the three-part Davidson test in 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ,r 23, 122 P.3d 506 (11 Stuart"). But the 
United States Supreme Court rejected that test on certiorari. Brigham City, 
547 U.S. 398. The high Court held that a warrantless entry II to render 
emergency assistance" is justified so long as officers have II an objectively 
reasonable basis'' to believe that a person is II seriously injured or threatened 
with such injury" inside the house. 547 U.S. at 403, 406; accord Fisher, 558 
U.S. at 47. In so holding, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected 
Utah's motivation and II protection of life" requirements. 
The Supreme Court noted that it has II repeatedly rejected" a test that 
examines officer motivation. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404; see also United 
States v. Najar. 451 F.3d 710, 718 (2006) (recognizing Brigham Cih/s rejection 
of the motivation requirement). It explained that an II action is 'reasonable' 
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of 
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mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action."' 
Id. at 404-405 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) 
(brackets in original). Simply put, an "officer's subjective motivation is 
irrelevant." Id. at 404. 
The Supreme Court also rejected Utah's strict "protection of life" 
requirement, holding that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment" requires 
police officers to wait until someone is '"unconscious' or 'semi-conscious' or 
worse before entering." Id. at 406. As explained in Michigan v. Fisher, 
" [ o ]fficers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' 
injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009). 
Indeed, "[t]he only injury police could confirm in Brigham City was the 
bloody lip they saw the juvenile inflict upon the adult." Id. Indeed, the "role 
of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not 
simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not like a boxing ( or 
hockey) referee, poised to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-sided." 
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406; accord State v. Anderson, 2015 UT 90, if if 22, 24, 
362 P.3d 1232 (recognizing that previous "life or limb" standard abrogated 
by Brigham City and Fisher). 
This Court in Davidson held that an officer's belief that emergency 
assistance is needed "must approxilnate probable cause." 2000 UT App 12, 
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if 15. But that holding too is incorrect. Brigham City did not require belief 
akin to probable cause for officers to enter a house under the emergency aid 
doch·ine. Id. at 406. As noted, all that the Court required is "an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or 
im1ninently tlu·eatened with such injury." Id. at 400 (emphasis added). This 
proximates the reasonable suspicion standard applied by the United States 
Supreme Court in other cases involving safety concerns. See, e.g., Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that "the issue is whether a reasonably 
prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
his safety or that of others was in danger"); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1050 (1983) (same); Maryland v. Buie, 494 u.s.· 325, 336 (1990) (holding that 
protective sweep must be "justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest 
scene"). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees. See United States v. 
Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 70 (10th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that "[o]fficers do not 
need probable cause if they face exigent circumstances in an emergency" aid 
situation); United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir.2008) 
(holding that e1nergency aid doctrine's reasonable belief standard "is more 
lenient than ... probable cause."); Najar, 451 F.3d at 718 (observing that 
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Brigham City did not require "probable cause in this type of exigent 
circun1stances"). 
B. Given the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Johnson had 
an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Defendant 
was in need of emergency assistance. 
As with reasonableness in any other search case, whether an officer's 
.. 1 • (' 1..... • • 1 "'1 • 1 .. • 1 • • 1 • • (' • , bener vvas OuJecnveiy reasonab1e 1s oasea on ·me r01:a11ry or rne 
circu1nstances known at the time- 11 guided by the realities of the situation 
presented by the record from the viewpoint of prudent, cautious and 
h·ained officers." _Najar, 451 F.3d at 718 (quotation and citation omitted); see 
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 (holding that officer's emergency aid entry 
depends on "the circu1nstances, viewed objectively") (quoting Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 
1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ( determination of exigency based on totality of 
the circumstances"); The reasonableness of the officer's belief should not be 
viewed in "hindsight." Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49. All that is required is that the 
officer has "' an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical 
assistance was needed, or persons were in danger."' Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 
(quoting Brigham. City, 547 U.S. at 406, Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394). Thus, even 
though a non-exigent reason may exist, that alone is insufficient to render 
an officer's belief um·easonable. See Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 ("Only when an 
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apparent threat has become an actual harm can officers rule out innocuous 
explanations for ominous circumstances."). 
Deputy Johnson's concern here that Defendant needed immediate 
assistance was objectively reasonable. Deputy Johnson, "guided by the 
realities of the situation," acted as any prudent, cautious, trained officer 
would in these circumstances. Najar, 451 F.3d at 718. Deputy Johnson knew 
that Defendant was in his mid-sixties and in poor health. R357:15-17. He 
also knew that no one had seen or heard from him in three days - which 
was unusual because Defendant spoke to his mother "almost daily." R356: 
34-35, 37; R357:15-17. Deputy Johnson observed signs that someone was 
home, yet no one responded to his knocks or calls into the house., and 
Defendant's mother was adamant that Defendant might need medical 
assistance. R356:35-37; R314. In Deputy Johnson's experience, similar 
situations led to finding individuals who were unconscious or dead. 
R356:47. 
With this perspective and these facts, Deputy Johnson's belief was 
objectively reasonable that Defendant was inside his home in need of 
medical assistance. Cf Anderson, 2015 UT 90, if,I28-29 (officer's belief 
reasonable that 1notorist may need assistance where motorist pulled over 
with e1nergency hazard lights on, on a very cold night in late December) 
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Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 (officer responding to 911 call saw blood drops on 
truck in driveway and reasonably believed emergency occurring); United 
States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1039-1040 (9th Cir. 2006) (entry into apartment 
reasonable where 911 call described domestic violence but no person 
responded at home); State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT App 65, iJ19, 108 P.3d 
123 ( officers reasonably believed, based on 911 call from victim's brother, 
that victim was potentially injured and that immediate intervention was 
necessary). 
Defendant contends, however, that Deputy Johnson had no 
reasonable basis to enter because he "did not observe Defendant lying on 
the floor inside" the house, "nor was there any indication" of "distress or 
foul play." Br. Aplt. 14. But "[r]easonable belief does not require absolute 
certainty." Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d at 1225. And for good reason. Limiting 
the exception to only when an officer actually sees an injury, distress, or foul 
play would hamstring law enforcement's ability to protect and serve- as 
persons who need help are often not in a place where they can be seen. See 
e.g., State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (little girl hidden 
in defendant's balcony closet, naked and bound with tape); People v. 
Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. App. 1976) (abrogated by 
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Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402) (missing hotel maid found dead, hidden in 
laundry bask~t inside defendant's hotel room closet). 
Furthermore, Deputy Johnson was not required to exhaust all 
possibilities before looking for Defendant inside the home, as "ironclad 
proof" of "a likely serious, life-threatening" injury is not necessary to invoke 
the emergency aid exception. Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49. (quotation omitted); 
Anderson, 2015 U.T. 90 at ,129 (even though motorist may have had a 
mundane reason for pulling over, officer "would have reason to be 
concerned and to at least stop to determine whether assistance is needed."); 
see also Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212 (police must act swiftly in emergency aid 
situations, as "people could well die in emergencies" if officers act too 
deliberately). As stated, all that is required is "' an objectively reasonable 
basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in 
danger." Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406). And 
here the circumstances indicated that Defendant was potentially in need of 
medical assistance and that immediate intervention was necessary. See 
Najar, 451 F.3d at 716-17, 720 (warrantless entry reasonable where someone 
at Najar's address called 911, hung-up, and dispatch was then unable to 
reconnect); Anderson, 2015 UT 90, if 28 (officer's belief reasonable given the 
seriousness of the perceived emergency). 
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In sum, Officer Johnson's entry into the home to check on 
Defendant's welfare was objectively reasonable. The trial court therefore 
correctly ruled that the officer's entry into Defendant's home and his 
subsequent search was reasonable under the e1nergency aid doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on March 11, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
LlNDSEYW ELER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF KANE 
76 North Main Street, Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone ( 435) 644-4923 Facsimile ( 435) 644-2052 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
TIMOTHY JOSHEPH ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 131600036 
Judge Marvin D. Bagley 
Submitted for decision are an Amended Motion to Suppress and a Motion to Quash 
Search Warrants Issued March 12, 2013 and March 13, 2013. The Motions were filed by 
defendant Timothy Joseph Adams and have been fully briefed. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On March 2, 2013, defendant's mother, Lynn Clark called Kane County Dispatch 
requesting that an officer check on her son at his home in Big Water, Utah. Ms. Clark reported 
she had not heard from her son in three days, that he has ongoing health issues, and that she was 
very worded. In response, Kane County Dispatch contacted Marshall Russell Johnson of the Big 
Water Marshall's Office and informed him of the request for a welfare check. Because Marshall 
Johnson was leaving town at the time, he asked Dispatch to contact Deputy Rob Johnson of the 
Kane County Sheriffs Office and ask him to perform the welfare check. 
Kane County Dispatch then contacted Deputy Rob Johnson and informed him of the 
request; and the reasons for the request. Deputy Johnson had previously regularly performed 
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welfare checks of the same nature and circumstances. Under such circumstances Deputy 
Johnson had in the past found individuals in their home either dead or incapacitated. 
Deputy Johnson proceeded to Defendant's home to perform the welfare check. He 
knocked on the door but no one answered. He found evidence around the home suggesting 
someone had recently been repairing leaky pipes under the home and working on top of the 
house. There was an extension cord that powered a light nmning from an open window to a 
crawl space under the home. There were tools on top of the roof near an air conditioning unit 
and the area near the crawl space was moist. Deputy Johnson yelled into the home but no one 
answered. Defendant's neighbors told Deputy Johnson they had not seen the defendant for two 
or three days. Deputy Johnson observed there was a light on in the living room but he could not 
see anything in the home from outside. Deputy Johnson called defendant's mother to discuss the 
situation with her. Defendant's mother relayed her previous concerns about her son to Deputy 
Johnson and asked him to "use whatever means necessary" to enter the home to ascertain if her 
son was okay. 
Deputy Johnson entered the home using the open living room window. Upon entering, 
Deputy Johnson immediately saw what he described as a "grow plant, a light plant to grow 
vegetation of sorts." There were several small plants of that he recognized to be marijuana. He 
took a picture of the plants on his cell phone. Deputy Johnson looked around the home in places 
defendant might have been; but could not locate him and left. 
Approximately a week later, defendant was seen in his front yard. On March 12, 2013, 
Marshall Russell Johnson filed an affidavit and obtained a search warrant to search defendant's 
1"1 
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home for the marijuana plants. On March 12, 2013 Marshall Johnson, Deputy Johnson and 
others executed the search warrant. Upon arriving at defendant's home, Deputy Johnson 
observed defendant standing by his Red Ford truck parked in front of the home on the side of the 
road. Defendant was texting on his phone. The driver side door of the truck was open. As 
Deputy Johnson approached the truck he could see several potted plants that appeared to be 
marijuana on the passenger floor of the truck. 
Deputy Johnson handed the issued search warrant to defendant and said, "I guess you 
know what this is about." Defendant responded with, "Yeah, I do.'' Deputy Johnson then asked. 
"Is there still any left in the house?" Defendant responded to the effect that there might be one 
or two plants. 
Officers then searched the home. Inside, they found several individually potted plants 
that appeared to be marijuana, several items of drug paraphernalia, heat lamps, and industrial 
lights. Officers also found a loaded .22 caliber rifle. The search ceased. The next day on March 
13, 2013, Marshall Johnson obtained a second search warrant for Defendant's vehicle; and to 
seize the gun and defendant's cell phone. 
ANALYSIS 
A search is unreasonable, and therefore, unconstitutional, when there is a warrantless 
government intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy; unless there is an exception to the 
warrant requirement. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized one such exception in Saft Lake 
City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 112-13, 994 P.2d 1283. The exception is known as the 
"emergency aid doctrine." The test for applying the emergency aid doctrine is satisfied when: 
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(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists 
and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of 
life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or 
place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be 
searched and the emergency. 
Id. at ~12. Another such exception is the "plain view" doctrine. "A seizure is valid under the 
plain view doctrine if(l) the officer is lawfully present, (2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the 
item is clearly incriminating." State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, ~22, 996 P.2d 555 (quoting 
State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352,357 (Utah Ct.App.1998)). 
Defendant claims Deputy Johnson never had the constitutional right to go inside his 
home. As such defendant asserts in his motions that the probable cause information relied upon 
for issuance of the first warrant was obtained illegally. Defendant also asserts the improperly 
obtained information not only invalidates the first warrant, but the second search warrant as well. 
He claims the information used to support the issuance of the second warrant was fruits of the 
improperly obtained first warrant. Defendant claims all evidence obtained as a result of Deputy 
Johnson's initial entry into defendant's home should be suppressed; and that the searches made 
pursuant to the first and second warrants should be quashed. 
In response, the State argues that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement 
supports a finding that Deputy Johnson's entry into defendant's home was lawful. The State also 
asserts that the plain view doctrine supports upholding the second search warrant. 
This Court is persuaded the facts surrounding Deputy Johnson's initial entry into 
defendant's home satisfies the legal requirements to invoke the emergency aid exception to the 
I 
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requirement that a warrant be obtained. Deputy Johnson spoke with defendant's mother who had 
regular, even daily contact with Defendant. Defendant's mother communicated she had not been 
able to reach defendant for days. She informed he was suffering with health issues. Defendant's 
mother was very concerned and relayed this information to Deputy Johnson. Defendant's 
neighbors informed Deputy Johnson they had not seed defendant for a few days. Deputy 
Johnson had previously regularly conducted welfare checks under the same types of 
circumstances. On those occasions he had discovered people in their homes that were deceased 
or incapacitated. Deputy Johnson observed signs suggesting that someone was home; but no one 
responded to his knock or calls into the home. Deputy Johnson relayed this information to 
Defendant's mother who was adamant that her son may be in need of medical help. 
Viewing these circumstances objectively, and as a whole, it was reasonable for Deputy 
Johnson to conclude there was an emergency and that defendant was in immediate need of life-
saving assistance. None of the circumstances indicate Deputy Johnson was motivated by intent 
to arrest or seize evidence. Deputy Johnson entered into the home through the living room 
window, where a light could be seen, and where an incapacitated person might have been. Once 
inside, Deputy Johnson observed what appeared to be marijuana growing in plain view. Deputy 
Johnson only looked for Defendant in places where an incapacitated person could be found. The 
entry and search were reasonable and lawful under the circwnstances. Consequently, Deputy 
Johnson's observation of the alleged grow was a lawful and valid basis on which to conclude that 
probable cause existed for authorization of a search warrant. 
.-•.\!,; / 
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Based on the above analysis, the second search warrant was not issued using fruit 
obtained from a poisonous tree. The second warrant was issued based on Deputy Johnson's 
observations while conducting the first search. Because of the first search warrant, Deputy 
Johnson was lawfully at and inside defendant's home. The gun, cell phone, and alieged 
marijuana in Defendant's truck were in plain view at that time. The items were incriminating 
given that defendant was apparently in possession of a firearm while possessing a certain amount 
of suspected controlled substances. In addition there were facts suggesting defendant was about 
to transport what appeared to be marijuana; and was using his cell phone. The Court is 
convinced the plain view exception applies to Deputy Johnson's observations while he was 
executing the first search warrant. As a result the second search warrant should not be quashed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Amended Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
defendant's Motion to Quash Search Warrants Issued March 12, 2013 and March 13, 2013 are 
DENlED. 
Dated this ·o~ Q / day,,of2014, ,.1\ . 
"' e U},/V'w V /1 1 , ~ L/ V ~J -)~ 
Marvin D. Bagley if 
District Court Judge 
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